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In November 2010 the European Commission has 
eventually issued its ‘Energy 2020’ communication1, a 
strategic document within the broader framework of 
the ‘Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’ programme2. The Energy 2020 
strategy—or the ‘Energy Initiative’—lays the ground-
work for a new approach to energy policy in the Euro-
pean Union (EU). Within the framework of Europe 
2020, the Energy Initiative collects the results of what 
had been already achieved through the 2000-2010 
Lisbon Strategy, identifies the shortcomings of past 
interventions3, and introduces new ambitious objec-
tives for the EU’s common energy policy actions in the 
coming years. 
The context: an unsustainable energy land-
scape? 
In order to achieve structural objectives of competitive 
and lasting growth, the EU has long identified energy 
sustainability as one of the short-term “greatest tests 
which Europe has to face”4. In order to succeed, the 
Member States and EU institutions have developed 
an ambitious plan to cut energy emissions, increase 
renewable sources’ quotas in the EU’s energy batch, 
and increase energy efficiency. All by 20%, all by 
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2020. The task is not easy, since the present scenario 
of energy production and consumption in Europe is 
anything but reassuring.  
Gross energy consumption in 2007 still depended 
for almost 80% upon fossil (oil and natural gas) and 
solid (e.g., coal) fuels, while consumption from re-
newable sources accounted for just 7.8% of the total5. 
Moreover, in the light of recent events, the contribu-
tion of nuclear energy to the overall EU energy pro-
duction endowment (13.4%) remains at least as con-
troversial as that of traditional sources. The changing 
ratio between fossil and renewable sources is not only 
an environmental concern. The rapid depletion of fos-
sil fuels and the increasing dependence upon specific 
(and thereby powerful) foreign producers6 elicits a 
security-of-supply issue, making traditional sources all 
the more unreliable in the longer run.  
As regards security of energy supply, policy action 
was urgently needed to face an increasingly unsus-
tainable import dependence—in particular as far as 
fossil and solid fuels were concerned. In 2007, ap-
proximately 83% of consumed oil had been imported. 
Nearly 60% of the overall natural gas consumption 
and 41% of solid fuels came from imported sources. 
Not only does this trend make the EU’s and its Mem-
ber States’ economies vulnerable to sudden disrup-
tions and crises (as the Russia-Ukraine ‘gas wars’ in 
2006 and 2009 have recently shown), but it also seri-
ously affects the international stature and leverage of 
the EU as a significant interlocutor in global energy 
governance and fora. 
As in several earlier communications7, finally, the 
European Commission has emphasised the impor-
tance of a new, ‘smarter’ concept of energy sustain-
ability. This builds on more efficient end-user con-
sumption as a way to reduce energy intensity and 
dependence, to increase energy diversification, and to 
meet some of the most pressing environmental con-
cerns.  
A disquieting international conjuncture, the effects 
of lasting economic crisis and uncertainty, and the 
growing awareness of the challenges threatening the 
environment and the prospects for a sustainable life in 
industrialised societies have all prompted a reaction 
from EU institutions and Member States. Inevitably, 
this needs to be quick, consistent, and feasible. On 
the grounds of the latest institutional developments of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, entered into force at the end of 
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2009, the EU has taken on the effort of a common 
energy strategy for its future. 
The content: the 2020 goal line and five key 
priorities 
The Energy Initiative starts where the Lisbon strategy 
stopped. In May 2007, the presidential conclusions of 
the Brussels European Council first set out the ambi-
tious 20-20-20 objective for the EU’s energy and cli-
mate change policies: a 20% reduction on CO2 emis-
sions, a 20% increase of energy efficiency, and a 
20% quota of renewable sources in the EU’s energy 
endowment to be achieved by 2020. The European 
Commission took on the challenge through its ‘Energy 
and Climate Package’8 that came eventually into force 
in 2009. Only a few months later, however, the Com-
mission did not hesitate to admit that the 2007 plat-
form was “unlikely to achieve all the 2020 targets” and 
in general “wholly inadequate to the longer term chal-
lenges”9. 
Accordingly, the Energy Initiative presents a wider 
array of short-term objectives, reform proposals, and 
policy priorities meant to strengthen the institutional 
basis of the 20-20-20 objectives. The document ac-
knowledges five key priorities ranging over energy 
efficiency, the implementation of the internal energy 
market, and energy implications on the EU’s external 
relations. While holding firm on the 2020 objectives, 
the Energy Initiative pictures a ‘cloud’ (see Figure 1) of 
strategic priorities for short- and medium-term action 
by EU institutions and Member States. 
 







Priority 1: an energy-efficient Europe 
 
Efficiency of consumption has now become a 
long-standing commitment of the EU, which has pro-
duced a number of leading documents and legislative 
efforts to meet the increasingly tight requirements of 
‘intelligent’ consumption in an energy-craving society. 
The European Energy Efficiency Action Plan10 (EEAP) 
was the first attempt to sort the EU’s policy interven-
tion on efficiency in an orderly fashion. The document 
and its annexes suggested tens of policy actions, pri-
orities, and proposal. The European Commission has 
recently published a new ‘Energy Efficiency Plan’11 
setting forth new guidelines for future policy options as 
well as presenting an assessment of previous legisla-
tive actions. 
Energy savings have been a crucial instrument to 
foster consumption efficiency. Especially in buildings 
and transport, EU institutions have emphasised how a 
functioning internal market, updated infrastructures, 
and balanced investment in development and tech-
nology can improve performance and at the same 
time curb down costs, squanders, and dependence 
on imports. The Energy Initiative and the Energy Effi-
ciency Plan have put forth a number of proposal on 
eco-design, energy efficiency schemes, and new effi-
ciency standards to be applied to European industries 
as well as to imports and third-party relations with 
non-EU partners. The Initiative, moreover, builds on 
the EEAP framework’s achievements over the last 
five years: energy consumption has not meaningfully 
increased in the 2005-2008 period while energy in-
tensity12 all over the EU-27 area has been steadily 
decreasing. 
Industrial performance remains in the spotlight. 
The Energy Initiative and the efficiency plan include 
several guidelines for both large companies and small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the manu-
facturing sector. Mandatory “regular energy audits”13 
as well as competitive best-practice policies will be 
implemented to secure benchmarking and compli-
ance. Besides this ‘negative’ performance control, the 
EU is trying to develop ‘positive’ measures that create 
incentives for an efficient energy economy, that is, 
new business opportunities in cleaner and more sus-
tainable energy to spread Europe-wide. 
Energy efficiency also has strong connections with 
radical innovations in energy supply. The EEAP, the 
Energy Initiative, and the new Energy Efficiency Plan 
are repleted with references to a more efficient and 
sustainable supply. This has several diverse implica-
tions. The EU has increasingly pushed for the diffu-
sion of renewable sources of energy and their techno-
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logical innovation. The new strategic documents have 
explicitly set out that the ‘renewables endowment’ of 
the EU is poor and obsolescent. The lack of truly intra-
European cross-border infrastructure, together with 
the reliance on “large hydropower, onshore wind, 
biomass and first-generation biofuels”14 is hampering 
the achievement of the 2020 objectives on renew-
ables15. Although the 2009 Renewable Energy Direc-
tive16 has framed these objectives into a binding legal 
instrument, to date implementation in the Member 
States has been poor, while national energy markets 
remain largely non-competitive and inward-looking. 
Priority 2: a consistent internal energy market 
A set of three basic issues is hindering the devel-
opment of an efficient internal energy market within 
the EU—a pre-condition for a sustainable energy fu-
ture for the continent: (a) harmonisation of market 
competitiveness rules within the Member States has 
been lacking; (b) technical and logistical infrastructure 
development has been inadequate; (c) available fund-
ing is insufficient to change this state of affairs.  
The European Commission has undertaken a ma-
jor legislative effort to tackle competition constraints 
by means of the 2009 ‘third legislative package’ of 
liberalisation rules for the energy market. Moreover, 
the financial crisis has elicited a new wave of protec-
tionist and nationally-framed intervention by Member 
States that certainly did not help implementation of 
EU norms. Finally, the EU has pushed for the har-
monisation of highly-diverging national rules by in-
creasing cooperation, dialogue, and exchange among 
national regulators and agencies. The Energy Regula-
tors Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) has met 
regularly since 2003, and the European Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) has 
taken up operations in Slovenia on March 3rd, 2011. 
The inadequacy of the current financial instru-
ments is all the more blatant when it comes to intra-
European energy infrastructure. The EU has invested 
both economic and political resources in the trans-
European energy networks (TEN-E), a broad project 
that covers pan-European infrastructure development 
and modernisation, alongside technological ameliora-
tion and supply diversification. Although several pro-
jects under the TEN-E umbrella have been success-
fully completed, the rate is still disappointing (9 pro-
jects of European interest out of 32). Moreover, a 
structural issue of lacking harmonisation and coordi-
nation among the Member States could not be solved 
over the years. Finally, a mere 155 million Euros was 
granted to fund TEN-E projects over the 2007-2013 
period.  
A small drop in the ocean of the “energy invest-
ments in the order of one trillion euros”17 that the 
Commission considers as a condition for overcoming 
the barriers to an efficient energy market, the Energy 
Initiative and the efficiency plan have adopted a new 
approach to project financing, in the attempt to link 
post-crisis recovery policies with energy and climate 
change policies. A nearly 4 billion euros programme 
(European Energy Programme for Recovery, EEPR) 
has been initiated in the attempt to likewise stimulate 
private investments in the sector. 
Priority 3: safer and secure energy 
The framework of the 2020 Energy Initiative em-
phasises the ‘role’ of the final consumer. European 
citizens are at the same time urged to engage in a 
more responsible and efficient consumption and ac-
knowledged as the legitimate recipients of “the best 
prices, the widest choice of suppliers and the best 
quality of service possible”18. On the one hand, EU 
institutions are promoting the development of con-
sumer-friendlier technologies that may help end-users 
both reducing consumptions and spreading best prac-
tices, provided that a more efficient and transparent 
consumption entails a positive cascade of effects on 
waste, demand, and diversification. On the other 
hand, and most interestingly, the Energy Initiatives 
addresses a specific class of citizens, that is, energy 
workers. Policies for ‘safer’ energy can also increase 
awareness of working conditions in the sector and 
enhance the development of safer and more efficient 
technologies for extraction, production, and distribu-
tion.  
Priority 4: a smarter and useful energy 
The Energy Initiative also attempts to join energy 
and knowledge together. Priority 4 builds on the ex-
perience of the 2000-2010 Lisbon Strategy—i.e., 
making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world”19—
borrowing the basic principle that no real policy pro-
gress is achievable unless it is first triggered by a 
meaningful “technological shift”20. The knowledge-
driven commitment of EU institutions revolves exten-
sively around the lynchpin of the Strategic Energy 
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Technology (SET) plans. The SET plans ambitiously 
aim to meet the target of a 20% drop in CO2 emis-
sions while boosting a cleaner-energy industry of 
green technology and infrastructures. 
Moreover, the SET plans specifically address the 
shortcomings of the previous energy efficiency frame-
works. Underdeveloped technologies—e.g., offshore 
wind power farms, solar power smart grids, second-
generation fuels, and even hydrogen—are included in 
the guidelines. Finally, these knowledge-centred ef-
forts in the Energy Initiative will absorb the largest 
financial resources of the strategy: initiatives for a 
gross amount of 10 billion Euros have already been 
set out in the strategic document. 
Priority 5: why a cohesive Europe cannot stay 
alone 
Energy external relations of the EU are a contro-
versial topic. The EU is at the same time a vulnerable 
player in the energy international arena and a model-
exporter. The EU lacks a consistent voice in global 
energy negotiations, while it is also seen as an all-but-
unique laboratory for comprehensive and state-of-the-
art energy standards and legislation. No doubt, this 
paradox has hindered the development of an actual 
‘EU foreign energy policy’. Yet, the external implica-
tions of Europe’s energy efficiency and supply remain 
a crucial topic for both policy-makers and academics. 
The EU is import-dependent. For decades now, 
the twenty-seven Member States have simply con-
sumed much more than they will ever possibly be 
able to produce. The EU is therefore bound to import. 
In exchange for its security of supply, the EU accepts 
the trade-off with dependence on external suppliers. 
As noted above, the EU’s supply pattern is not reas-
suring: just two sources provide the EU with nearly 
half of its oil and three producers with over 80% of its 
natural gas supplies.  
Diversification is therefore a crucial objective for 
the sustainable future of Europe’s energy security. On 
the one hand, EU institutions have focussed their ef-
forts on the diversification of supply: energy substitu-
tion (i.e., decreasing dependence from fossil fuels and 
combustibles, while increasing reliance on renewable 
sources) would theoretically trigger a positive loop by 
reducing dependence on external import, addressing 
environmental concerns, and boosting business and 
investment opportunities. On the other hand, EU insti-
tutions have somewhat neglected the possibility to 
‘diversify suppliers’, that is, to give the EU such a 
strong common voice in external energy relations that 
it may be able to overcome import fragmentation 
among its Member States and gain bargaining power 
when dealing with external suppliers.  
The case of EU-Russia relations is a telling exam-
ple. The EU has lacked a degree of cohesion and 
strategic coordination that would have allowed it to 
avoid the consequences of the ‘gas wars’ between 
Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. When defining 
its institutional relationship with the EU over the last 
twenty years, the Russian Federation has overtly ob-
structed any binding agreements on energy, even 
though 46% of Russia’s overall exports go to the EU, 
and energy products amount for nearly 80% of this 
share21. By privileging bilateral intergovernmental re-
lations, Russia bypasses the EU as a single energy 
market player in order to fragment its weight at the 
negotiation table. Although the concept of EU-Russia 
interdependence, especially in the academia, is now 
given extensive credit22, in actuality—by transforming 
its main energy buyer and energy trade partner into 
an unsettled archipelago of divergent interests and 
jealousies—Russia has upset the balance of its rela-
tion with the EU largely in its own favour. 
The Energy Initiative, however, attempts to im-
prove the performance of the EU as a single, consis-
tent energy player by enhancing its own role as a 
norm-exporter and standard-setter. The 2020 strategy 
supports the expansion of the successful model of the 
EU’s internal market to the EU’s greater geographic 
proximity. Existing institutional frameworks such as 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Energy 
Community, and the processes of stabilisation and 
accession should work as proxies, vehicles of the 
norms that structure and define the EU’s energy mar-
ket. A harmonised broader ‘European’ energy market 
that includes the EU as well as key producing part-
ners and transit countries is a pre-condition for the 
development of new infrastructure, a drop in transac-
tion and adaptation costs, and an upsurge in invest-
ments and opportunities within a significantly larger 
‘common energy market’. 
The EU is also trying to use its know-how and ex-
pertise in technological development—hardly paired 
by any of its partners—to spread its own industrial, 
legal, and political standards worldwide. In the midst 
of an international conjuncture of economic crisis, 
climate change concerns, and unsustainable devel-
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opment patterns, the EU as a ‘single player’ is guiding 
a process of innovation on a global scale: the EU has 
cooperated with the G8 countries to establish an In-
ternational Partnership on Energy Efficiency Coopera-
tion (IPEEC); the European Commission owns a “right 
of scrutiny” on every nuclear energy agreement that 
EU Member States and third parties negotiate; the EU 
has supported and guided the establishment of the 
new International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENE) and the renovation of the International En-
ergy Agency’s (IEA) mandate. This strategy has not 
always been successful. The Energy Charter Treaty, 
a pioneering project of integration and harmonisation 
that the EU has supported since 1991, is still dragging 
itself in a political limbo that prevents it to be as effec-
tive an international energy policy platform as it was 
originally meant to be. 
Crisis, however, can offer the EU new momentum 
and opportunities. The expansion of the ‘green econ-
omy’ and the growing sensitivity of global climate 
change issues can give EU institutions a new spring-
board for global leadership. The EU has a valuable 
comparative advantage in greener technologies, pol-
icy-making know-how, and cultural awareness. The 
prospects of a low-carbon industrial society and sus-
tainable productivity can be a ‘new beginning’ for the 
EU to speak with one powerful voice in global energy 
relations. 
A 2020 commitment-expectations gap? 
The Energy Initiative certainly sets out ambitious ob-
jectives that could not be achieved without a structural 
revision of the EU’s instruments and powers. The en-
ergy market of the EU remains a fragmented reality, 
where a multiplicity of (often diverging) interests col-
lide and disperse in a nebula of needs, demands, and 
egoisms. If differences in goals and objectives among 
Member States persist, it is likewise true that they 
have fewer incentives to commit. The Energy Initiative 
was thought to call for new action, a more responsible 
way of thinking of energy policy and energy security 
as a shared European concern. 
The Energy Initiative rests, however, on solid pol-
icy bases. It builds on the legacy of the Lisbon Strat-
egy for a more competitive knowledge-based econ-
omy in the EU and on the financial and political sup-
port of the broader ‘Europe 2020’ strategy to which 
EU institutions and Member States have committed 
for the next decade. But, even more importantly, the 
Energy Initiative also builds on the developments of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Entered into force in December 
2009, the Treaty has given a new and stronger thrust 
to energy policy in Europe. The Lisbon Treaty has 
renovated the administrative and political machinery 
of the EU, especially through the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The TFEU now explicitly lists energy as a “shared 
competence between the Union and its Member 
States”23, an attribution that was completely absent in 
the previous Treaty system. According to the new 
rules, moreover, Member States can legislate 
autonomously only in the absence of earlier EU 
norms on energy policy. This ‘copernican revolution’ is 
completed by the introduction of a Treaty title (XXI, 
Article 194 TFEU) specifically dedicated to energy. 
Article 194 broadens the EU’s room for manoeuvre by 
scrapping the previous label of ‘internal market’ in 
favour of that of ‘energy market’. This rule, conse-
quently, allows the EU to take on new competencies 
on energy external relations. 
What the EU really faces, ultimately, is a decade in 
which the opportunities may well outnumber the chal-
lenges. Surely, the EU will have to recover from a 
disastrous economic recession; it will have to heal an 
increasingly unsustainable industrialised society that 
can neither forgo its wealth nor keep growing in a dis-
orderly and irresponsible way; it will have to overcome 
natural challenges such as resource depletion and 
climate change without causing more environmental 
harm; and it will have to focus on the longer-term wel-
fare of the generations of European citizens yet to 
come.  
The Energy Initiative is part of this process. It 
builds on past experiences and draws a viable future 
of efficient energy consumption, environmentally-
concerned development and knowledge, and consis-
tent presence in the global energy arena. Energy 
2020 is a starting point. It is a call for solidarity among 
EU Member States and commitment to a new way of 
thinking about energy policy: once again the EU can 
be a first-mover towards a more sustainable future, 
and the Energy Initiative takes on the first step. 
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